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In 2012, negotiations over an EU–China 
bilateral investment agreement were 
launched to fully tap into the potential of 
bilateral investments. This policy brief 
gives an overview of the current 
negotiation process and argues that the 
high hopes advanced politically and 
economically in the agreement must be 
weighed against the many challenges 
and obstacles the negotiations face, 
regarding current events in EU–China 
relations, in global trade and investment 
regimes, and the limits of EU 
competencies. Strategically, the 
agreement could be important, as it 
offers the potential to strengthen the 
EU’s global economic relevance. This 
brief concludes that there is much to 
gain if the EU follows a coordinated 
approach and remains mindful of these 
(potential) obstacles. 
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2008. The need for liquidity in European 
countries served as an impetus to enhance the 
possibilities of acquiring investments from 
outside Europe, while China pursues secure 
and predictable environments for its 
investments. The EU–China BIA is one of the 
priorities of the EU’s new trade and 
investment strategy ‘Trade for All’, as a means 
to deepen relations with China. According to 
optimistic estimates, the negotiations could be 
concluded within one year. 
 
Historically, EU–China relations have been 
focused to a large extent on trade in goods, 
and recently trade in services has also been 
growing rapidly. The field of investments is 
still seen as holding vast untapped potential 
for European and Chinese economies. While 
China is the EU’s second largest trading 
partner, investments from the EU in China 
amount to a mere 5% of European 
investments abroad and only a fraction of the 
overall trade volume. In turn, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) from China represents less 
than 3% of the total FDI inflow into the EU.1 
The BIA is under negotiation to increase the 
market access of European companies in 
China as well as facilitate Chinese investments 
into European countries, thereby increasing 
the overall investment flows between the EU 
and China.  
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A NEED FOR INCREASED INVESTMENT 
In January 2016, representatives of the 
European Commission and the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce met in Beijing for the 
ninth round of negotiations over a bilateral 
investment agreement (BIA) between the EU 
and China. Negotiations over the BIA were 
initiated after the eurozone crisis erupted in 
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HIGH HOPES FOR THE BIA 
In addition to the anticipated economic gains 
from increased investments, European policy-
makers and businesses alike have placed high 
hopes in the conclusion of this agreement. 
Following recent stagnation in the EU–China 
relationship, the BIA is seen as a realistic 
opportunity to rekindle relations on a 
substantial level. On the political side, EU–
China relations have lost momentum since the 
negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement – conceived as the next step in 
enhancing the EU–China relationship – stalled 
in 2011. The Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership concluded in 2003 remains rather 
vague in its language, prompting many to 
doubt its significance. Similarly, the large 
number of dialogues the EU maintains with 
China (over 70 in total), convened in varying 
intervals, does enhance exchange on different 
levels, but is criticised for its lack of concrete 
and visible output. The conclusion of the BIA 
would hence represent the first major 
agreement between the EU and China since 
2003. 
 
On the business side, China’s strategic 
importance to the global investment plans of 
European companies remains unparalleled. 
However, while 76% of the respondents in the 
annual business confidence survey of the 
European Chamber of Commerce described 
China as their top or top three destination for 
new investments in 2012, this number 
dropped to 58% in 2015.2 This fall is due to 
the difficult regulatory environment in China. 
Despite reform initiatives by the Chinese 
government, many remain unconvinced that 
the situation will improve soon. For instance, 
the European business sector had high hopes 
that the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (SFTZ), an 
experimental arrangement, would include 
currency liberalisation, market-determined 
interest rates and free trade. Yet, reforms have 
been slower than anticipated, the list of 
industries off-limits to foreign investors 
remains too long, and, overall, the 
expectations for the SFTZ have hardly been 
met. The inclusion of substantial market access 
in the BIA, however, would ease and expand 
the possibilities for European companies 
operating in China. 
 
DIFFERING OBJECTIVES 
Investment agreements are designed to 
establish the terms for investment between the 
participating countries, determine the level of 
protection of investments, as well as the 
number of guarantees, procedures and 
opportunities available to investors in the 
event of conflict with the state. The EU and 
China, however, differ in their specific 
objectives regarding the BIA.  
 
The objectives of the EU include improving 
the legal certainty regarding treatment of EU 
investors in China, improving the protection of 
EU investments, reducing investment barriers 
and increasing the bilateral investment flows. 
Market access – the largest impediment to EU 
investment in China – remains the most salient 
issue. A study by Copenhagen Economics on 
behalf of the European Commission found 
that the existing BIAs between individual 
Member States and China already provide 
investment protection – although most of 
these BIAs are no longer reflective of 
economic realities since they were agreed in the 
1980s and 1990s. The study concludes that a 
mere consolidation of current BIAs with China 
into a single EU-wide agreement would be 
unlikely to significantly increase FDI flows 
from the EU to China, but this assessment 
changes and includes substantial benefits 
through increased FDI flows when considering 
the reduction of current investment barriers.3 
Hence, the impact of a BIA with China for the 
EU depends on the inclusion of substantial 
market access.  
 
Existing restrictions to foreign investors in 
China include pre-establishment treatment of 
investors such as market entry and government 
approval, equity and technology transfer (joint 
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venture obligations), as well as limited access 
to financial support and government 
procurement and unfair competition practices 
of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises post-
establishment.  
 
In contrast, market access is less urgent for 
China as the European market is already 
relatively open to foreign investments. For 
China, the consolidation of existing BIAs into 
a single regulation providing more clarity 
would already be of great benefit. The BIA 
also provides an opportunity for China to 
prove its reliability as a partner, especially in 
light of its interest in negotiating a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the EU in the long run. 
The EU has indicated consent to FTA 
negotiations under the condition that the BIA 
be successfully concluded and that China 
demonstrates progress in its internal reforms, 
especially regarding the role of the market and 
creating a level playing field for foreign 
investors. China’s specific objectives for the 
BIA are to consolidate the status quo and 
create EU-wide uniform protection for 
Chinese investments, to increase the legal 
certainty regarding the treatment of Chinese 
investors in the EU, to safeguard the existing 
openness of EU economies to investments, 
and to increase the overall investment flows.  
 
The changing commercial and business 
motives of Chinese companies and the 
diversification of Chinese investments increase 
China’s need to find secure places for 
investments. Chinese investments are 
increasingly moving away from energy and raw 
materials in developing countries and into 
energy distribution, infrastructure, mergers and 
acquisitions for brand names, high technology 
and market shares in advanced economies.4 In 
line with this development, the Chinese 
government is encouraging companies to 
invest overseas through its ‘Going Out’ policy, 
and pursuing negotiations on investment 
treaties. 
 
LIMITS TO EU COMPETENCIES? 
The EU and China formally announced the 
launch of the BIA negotiations during the EU–
China Summit in February 2012. This is the 
first negotiation of a stand-alone investment 
agreement under the new Lisbon Treaty 
(2009), which makes FDI an EU competence. 
Hence the European Commission negotiates 
on behalf of the Member States. However, the 
Treaty does not provide a definition of FDI 
and therefore does not define the exact scope 
of the EU’s competence in this area, which is 
contested regarding the protection of foreign 
investment, transport services, intellectual 
property, transparency and sustainable 
development.  
 
The EU’s approach to solving this problem has 
so far been to await the decision on a different 
case, namely the EU–Singapore FTA, which 
was referred to the European Court of Justice 
in 2014.5 However, the Court has not yet 
reached a conclusion. If the Court decides that 
the competencies of the EU Institutions do 
not reach sufficiently far, this could greatly 
delay the ratification of the BIA – and other 
trade agreements, for that matter – as each will 
need to be ratified by each Member State’s 
parliament. This could increase the weight of 
individual Member States in the negotiation 
process. National parliaments could also block 
the agreement, although to date few Member 
States’ parliaments have exercised this scrutiny 
in mixed agreements. The extended ratification 
process would, however, prolong the already 
rather lengthy process of negotiating a market 
access agreement and delay its implementation. 
 
The concluded agreement must in any case 
pass through the Council and the European 
Parliament (EP). However, especially in the 
EP, there has not been much debate over the 
BIA until now. This might prove dangerous, as 
the negotiations will already be concluded by 
the time of voting in the EP and the likelihood 
of incorporating changes would be very low. 
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The power of the EP should not be 
underestimated as it has proven that it can and 
will deny consent when it deems this 
appropriate.6 On current trade and investment 
relations, the EP has been very vocal on 
existing Investor–State Dispute Settlement 
Schemes (ISDS), prompting the Commission 
to present a possible new model. This 
proposition would, if agreed by China, also be 
included in the BIA.7 
 
REACHING A VIABLE AGREEMENT 
Since 2012, nine rounds of negotiations have 
been held. During the latest round, in January 
2016, an agreement was reached on the scope 
of the agreement, meaning that the 
negotiations can move into a more substantive 
phase, negotiating on a common basis and 
specific content. EU officials see this as a very 
important step that was anticipated by the 
President of the Commission Jean-Claude 
Juncker and the Chinese Prime Minister Li 
Keqiang during the EU–China Summit in 
Summer 2015.  
 
However, doubts are raised that an effective 
and viable agreement can be reached in the 
near future. Indeed, in addition to the possible 
difficulties in the ratification process outlined 
above, there might be further impediments to 
the negotiations. In December 2016, a 
provision in China’s accession protocol to the 
WTO from 2001 expires, prompting a debate 
on how to deal with this change. China sees it 
as its legal right according to the WTO 
protocol to be granted Market Economy Status 
(MES) at the end of this year. This view is not 
supported by most in the EU institutions, as 
China does not fulfil the EU’s criteria for 
MES. However, the current legislation allowing 
the EU to impose anti-dumping measures 
against Chinese goods with distorted prices will 
most likely need to be adapted by December, 
in order to further protect European steel, 
chemical and ceramic industries. Any decision 
of the EU regarding China’s MES might 
impact the negotiations on the BIA if China 
feels wrongly treated. However, even if China 
were to link MES to progress on the BIA, this 
does not imply that the EU needs to be 
susceptible to Chinese pressure, as the leaked 
decision of the Commission’s legal service 
from June 2015 suggests. In any case, China’s 
incentives to keep the negotiations going are 
very strong.  
 
Even though the EU is very keen on attracting 
Chinese investments, for instance, through its 
participation in the European Fund for 
Strategic Investment (EFSI),8 China is also in 
need of increasing its investments abroad and 
securing its place in global and regional trade 
and investment regimes. Most notably, China 
has been excluded from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), a free trade agreement 
concluded with 12 Pacific-Rim countries under 
the lead of the United States. With the United 
States simultaneously negotiating Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) with the EU, trade and investment 
infrastructure is being built up globally. China 
could increase its role in these global dynamics 
by negotiating an FTA with the EU. Yet this 
will only happen after the successful 
conclusion of the BIA. 
 
At the same time, the United States is also 
negotiating an investment agreement with 
China. The negotiations differ from the EU’s 
as European countries already have BIAs in 
place with China, hence a baseline on 
investment protection already exists. Already 
launched in 2008, the negotiations between 
Beijing and Washington have not been at the 
top of the political agenda. While both 
governments remain positive, business has 
voiced disappointment over the progress made. 
In September 2015, reduced ‘negative lists’ 
were exchanged, outlining the sectors China 
seeks to exclude from the agreement. This is a 
positive sign for the EU–China BIA, given that 
the EU has been urging for the use of a 
negative list as well to ensure market access for 
European companies. As the negotiations are 
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going on in parallel, a comparison of both 
agreements, when finalized, will surely be 
interesting. 
 
The challenge for the EU will be to strike a 
balance between the short-term economic 
interests of its Member States, possible 
pressures from China, and ideally positioning 
the EU in global trade regimes. To be sure, the 
global trade picture is becoming more complex 
with the increase of overlapping regional trade 
and investment agreements. In this context, it 
is paramount that the EU retains a central 
place as leading trade region, and strengthens 
its economic relevance through the conclusion 
of state-of-the-art trade and investment 
agreements. To this end, an overview and 
coordination between the many different 
projects, initiatives, platforms and agreements 
is essential.  
 
In contrast, lack of coordination among 
Member States, as was seen in early 2015 when 
European countries rushed to join the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank individually, 
significantly impairs the EU’s negotiating 
power. Sustained lack of coordination could 
negatively affect the EU’s decision-making 
abilities on MES, its coordination with the 
16+1 forum between China and Central and 
Eastern European countries, its participation in 
China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 
initiative, and, of course, the negotiations over 
the BIA – resulting in poorer outcomes for the 
EU. 
 
The relationship between the EU and China 
has long been driven by Member States rather 
than by following a concise EU-led strategy. 
Against this background, Member States have 
followed different trade strategies towards 
China, many of which focussed more on trade 
in goods than attracting FDI. Given that in the 
current economic situation investments are 
seen as the main contributor to economic 
growth – creating jobs and increasing 
productivity – the Commission welcomed 
China’s announcement that it would invest in 
the EFSI. However, previous Chinese 
investments have come under criticism in 
many European countries for misconduct, lack 
of quality, social dumping, as well as targeting 
sensitive industries and even sparking fears 
over national security risks. In these cases, the 
BIA may serve as a tool to ensure a high 
standard of Chinese investments in the future.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The need for investments in Europe and China 
alike is driving the negotiations. From this 
outset it is likely that the different objectives in 
the negotiations can be consolidated. In 
addition, as OBOR on the Chinese side and 
the EFSI on the EU side are already under 
way, they can serve as tools to increase bilateral 
investments in the short-term and bridge the 
period of time until the BIA comes into effect. 
In contrast, even though negotiations on the 
BIA may be – by optimistic calculations – 
concluded within one year, the agreement 
would only come into effect after several years, 
depending on the possibly extended ratification 
process. The BIA therefore serves as a long-
term tool to enhance investment between the 
EU and China, rather than promising short-
term benefits.  
 
Another factor to be kept in mind are the 
economic developments in China and worries 
about a significant slowdown of the Chinese 
economy. As undecided as economists are in 
predicting what might happen in China in the 
next year and to what extent the Chinese 
Communist Party has the tools to mitigate a 
possible hard landing, the long-term effects on 
European economies also remain to be seen. 
However, due to the overall slow-down of the 
Chinese economy, China’s interest in 
increasing its investments abroad, and its 
ambition to progress towards an FTA with the 
EU are all strong indications of China’s 
willingness to finalize the negotiations in the 
near future. 
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To conclude, successful negotiations have the 
potential to not only increase investment flows 
and contribute to economic growth, but also to 
strengthen the EU’s overall relationship with 
China. They can further serve to demonstrate 
the effective implementation of the EU’s trade 
and investment strategy internally and 
strengthen the EU’s economic relevance in 
global trade and investment regimes. However, 
policy-makers on both sides of the negotiations 
need to remain aware of the potential obstacles. 
In order to obtain the best outcome, the EU 
needs to follow a coordinated approach and 
ensure that the implementation of the agreement 
actually significantly improves the situation for 
European companies in China. As the example 
of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone has shown, 
all that glitters is not gold.  
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